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Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21

United Arab Emirates*

The present report is a summary of 9 stakeholders' submissions¹ to the universal periodic review. It follows the general guidelines adopted by the Human Rights Council in its decision 17/119. It does not contain any opinions, views or suggestions on the part of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), nor any judgement or determination in relation to specific claims. The information included herein has been systematically referenced in endnotes and, to the extent possible, the original texts have not been altered. As provided for in Resolution 16/21 of the Human Rights Council, where appropriate, a separate section is provided for contributions by the national human rights institution of the State under review that is accredited in full compliance with the Paris Principles. The full texts of all submissions received are available on the OHCHR website. The report has been prepared taking into consideration the periodicity of the review and developments during that period.

* The present document was not edited before being sent to United Nations translation services.

I. Background and framework

A. Scope of international obligations

1. Amnesty International (AI), Joint Submission 1 (JS1), the International Center for Supporting Rights and Freedoms (ICSRF) and Organization for Defending Victims of Violence (ODDV) recommended that the UAE sign and ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).² Alkarama recommended that the UAE ratify ICCPR.³
2. AI called on the UAE to ratify the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW) and the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.⁴
3. ODDV and ICSRF called on the UAE to accede to the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED).⁵ ODDV also recommended accession to the additional protocol to the International Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.⁶
4. JS1 called on the UAE to ratify ILO Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 on freedom of association and collective bargaining.⁷
5. ICSRF recommended the adoption of a law to confirm the primacy of international treaties and agreements over national legislation.⁸

B. Constitutional and legislative framework

6. AI called on the UAE to amend the Constitution and other relevant legislation to ensure that human rights may be enjoyed equally by non-citizens, in accordance with international human rights law.⁹
7. ICSRF recommended that a provision be included in the Constitution to guarantee that citizenship is a right of citizens which may not be withdrawn.¹⁰
8. Alkarama noted reports indicating that the authorities were preparing a new draft law regarding the judicial system, which would inter alia name the UAE President as the head of the Federal Judicial Council, in contradiction to the principle of separation of powers.¹¹

C. Institutional and human rights infrastructure and policy measures

9. JS1 called on the UAE to implement its 2008 commitment to establish an independent national human rights institution that could advise the Government and receive and investigate complaints by the public.¹²
10. Alkarama noted that the establishment of a national human rights institution in accordance with the Paris Principles would be an important step towards the improvement of the human rights situation.¹³

II. Cooperation with human rights mechanisms

11. AI welcomed the Government's invitation to the UN Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, noting that a visit to the UAE had taken place in 2012.¹⁴

12. Alkarama recommended that the UAE extend a standing invitation to United Nations Special Procedures.¹⁵

13. AI noted that the UAE is a candidate in the 2012 elections to the UN Human Rights Council.¹⁶

III. Implementation of international human rights obligations

A. Equality and non-discrimination

14. JS1 asserted that the rejection by the UAE, during its previous review in 2008, of recommendations on ending discrimination between men and women was contrary to its international human rights obligations. It stated that UAE law discriminates against women by granting men privileged status in matters of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody. It recommended that the UAE amend statutes of family law to ensure that women have equal status to men in matters of divorce, inheritance, and child custody.¹⁷

15. JS1, noting that the UAE hosts between 10,000 and 100,000 stateless residents known as Bidoun, stated that, due to their stateless status, the Bidoun face obstacles in many areas, such as access to healthcare and education.¹⁸ Alkarama noted that the Bidoun lacked access to basic citizens' rights, although some individuals had lived in the UAE territory for several generations.¹⁹ ICSRF indicated that the Bidoun faced problems in obtaining birth and death certificates or any other official documents, that they could not have their house or car ownership registered in their names or obtain a driving license. Furthermore, they faced problems when trying to enroll their children in Government schools or obtain free treatment at Government hospitals.²⁰ JS1 noted reports that, in 2012, Interior Ministry officials had stepped up pressure on stateless residents to apply for citizenship in other countries.²¹

16. JS1 recommended that the UAE develop a strategic plan to remedy the longstanding problem of statelessness in accordance with international legal standards and in consultation with UNHCR and local civil society organizations; publish a roadmap and timetable for ending statelessness in the UAE; grant temporary legal residency to stateless individuals pending resolution of their claims to UAE nationality, and cease efforts to pressure stateless residents into applying for other nationalities. It also called on the UAE to halt any proceedings that would revoke citizenship from government critics, restore citizenship to those from whom it was stripped arbitrarily or which rendered the person stateless, and return all official identification and travel documents.²²

B. Right to life, liberty and security of the person

17. AI noted that the UAE retains the death penalty in national legislation, including for offences which do not meet the criterion of "most serious crimes", for which the death penalty may be imposed under international law. In October 2009, the President had issued a decree relating to national security, which, among other things, provides for the imposition of the death penalty against people convicted of disclosing information that harms the state. In 2011, the UAE had resumed executions for the first time since 2008. At least 31 death sentences had been imposed in 2011. The Supreme Court had also handed down death sentences to juvenile offenders in violation of international law.²³ AI called on the UAE to establish a moratorium on executions with a view to abolishing the death penalty as provided by UN General Assembly resolutions. Pending full abolition of the death penalty, the UAE should abolish it for all crimes that do not meet the threshold of "most serious crimes", including for drug trafficking and for disclosing information that harms the state; and ensure that no death sentences are handed down to juvenile offenders.²⁴

ICSRF noted that the UAE Penal Code prescribes the death penalty for a considerable number of crimes. It recommended that the death penalty be abolished.²⁵

18. Alkarama stated that the issue of arbitrary arrests and detentions was a crucial issue which needed to be addressed as part of the UAE's second UPR cycle. According to Alkarama, many people continue to be arbitrarily detained, tortured and in some cases convicted without receiving the minimum guarantees of a fair trial. Security forces, namely the Criminal Investigations Department (CID), had continued to carry out arrests without warrants. The duration of police custody and preventative detention set by the Criminal Procedure Code was not respected in numerous cases, and judges prolonged the detention indefinitely without charge. Secret detention was also a common practice, especially when arrests were carried out by the State Security for political reasons.²⁶ ICSRF also drew attention to incidents of arrests outside the legal framework.²⁷ JS1 recommended that the UAE end the practice of arbitrary detention by ensuring that authorities, including security agencies, comply with UAE and international law, promptly inform persons of the reason for their arrest, and charge or release them accordingly.²⁸

19. Alkarama noted reports by human rights defenders and former detainees drawing attention to the practice of torture in places of detention, notably in pre-trial detention. Al-Wathba prison in Abu Dhabi was notorious for the practice of torture. According to Alkarama, confessions extracted under torture had been used to condemn individuals. Alkarama recommended that the UAE take all necessary measures to ensure that torture and ill-treatment cease in all places of detention.²⁹ ICSRF similarly stated that torture occurred in some prisons. It recommended that prison conditions be improved, and that a law be adopted to allow civil society organizations to visit prisons.³⁰

20. AI noted that it had regularly raised concerns regarding individuals arrested by Amn al-Dawla (State Security). Such individuals were commonly held incommunicado for prolonged periods of time, in undisclosed locations, where they may face solitary confinement, torture and other ill-treatment. Detainees' allegations that they had been tortured were rarely investigated. Victims of torture and other ill-treatment report that they had been forced to sign self-incriminating statements and then been charged and prosecuted on the basis of such "confessions".³¹

21. ODVV deplored that victims of trafficking were not protected by the law as the Government did not distinguish between prostitution and forced sexual exploitation. ODVV recommended that victims of trafficking be placed under special protection, and not be regarded as criminals.³²

22. JS1 stated that victims of rape and sexual abuse were ostracized by authorities, society, and even their families.³³

23. JS1 indicated that despite the existence of shelters and hotlines to help protect women, domestic violence remained a pervasive problem. The Penal Code gave men the legal right to discipline their wives and children, including through the use of physical violence.³⁴ AI and JS1 noted a 2010 judgment by the Federal Supreme Court which upheld a husband's right to "chastise" his wife and children.³⁵ The ruling, citing the UAE Penal Code, sanctioned beating and other forms of punishment or coercion providing it leaves no physical marks.³⁶

24. JS1 recommended that the UAE introduce legislation to prohibit the right of men to inflict beatings and other forms of physical punishment or coercion on their wives; protect victims of rape and sexual assault by offering health services and medical attention; cease prosecutions of rape victims for "illicit sex"; offer proper trainings to police, investigators, public prosecutors, and judges on how to handle cases of sexual assault; and ensure that policewomen with specialized training are available to assist and support women who report rape.³⁷

25. Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children (GIEACPC) noted that in the UAE, corporal punishment of children was prohibited at school, but lawful at home. It also noted that in the penal system, corporal punishment is lawful as a sentence for crime. In this regard, it recalled relevant recommendations of the CRC.³⁸

C. Administration of justice, including impunity, and the rule of law

26. JSI called on the UAE to promptly and impartially investigate all allegations of torture by security and police forces and prosecute any official found responsible for ordering, carrying out, or acquiescing in torture or ill-treatment.³⁹ Alkarama similarly recommended that allegations of torture be appropriately investigated; that those found responsible be sanctioned appropriately; that reparation be provided to victims of torture; and that statements and confessions obtained through torture and ill-treatment be excluded from legal proceedings.⁴⁰

27. AI recommended that the commitment to hold perpetrators of torture accountable should be officially and publicly communicated to all officers involved in arrest, detention and interrogation, in particular those of the *Amn al-Dawla*. AI further recommended that the UAE immediately end all incommunicado and secret detention; ensure that detainees have immediate access to their lawyers and families, as well as to adequate medical care; ensure that detainees are brought promptly before a judge to rule on the lawfulness of their detention; maintain a central register to ensure that all detainees can be promptly traced; bring appropriate sanctions against officers responsible for the unlawful detention of detainees; allow regular, unannounced and unrestricted inspections by independent national and international expert bodies to all places where people are, or may be, deprived of their liberty; and ensure that detainees who lodge complaints about torture or other ill-treatment can do so without fear of any kind of reprisal or prosecution.⁴¹

28. In connection with the UAE's preparation of a new draft law regarding the judicial system, Alkarama recommended that the UAE ensure the full independence of the judiciary and compliance with international fair trial standards. Alkarama also called on the UAE to ensure that all those detained arbitrarily are tried or released as quickly as possible.⁴²

29. ICSRF recommended that the UAE ensure that the power to order arrest or detention should lie with the judiciary only and not with the executive power. It also recommended the adoption of legal provisions limiting pre-trial detention, as well as provisions allowing individuals that have been arrested, accused or judged without a legal basis to claim compensation. Furthermore, it recommended that training for law enforcement officers take account of international human rights standards.⁴³

30. ODVV stated that the age of 7 years for criminal responsibility was too low. It urged the Government to amend the Juvenile Criminal Law and raise the age to international standards.⁴⁴

D. Right to marriage and family life

31. AI noted that the UAE authorities had made some progress on the recommendation to consider allowing female citizens married to non-citizens to pass on their nationality to their children. In November 2011, the UAE President had issued a directive giving the children of UAE women married to foreign nationals the right to apply for citizenship when they reach 18 years of age.⁴⁵

E. Freedom of religion or belief, expression, association and peaceful assembly, and right to participate in public and political life

32. AI noted that, despite the UAE's support of a recommendation to limit the number and extent of restrictions, it had documented deepening repression of dissent in the past four years, including arbitrary arrests, threats to revoke citizenship of political activists, and increased restrictions on civil society organisations.⁴⁶ AI and Front Line Defenders - The International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (FLD) noted that although freedom of expression was guaranteed under Article 30 of the UAE's Constitution, its exercise was severely restricted, including by Articles 8 and 176 of the Penal Code, which permit prison sentences of up to five years for insulting UAE rulers or the national flag or emblem.⁴⁷

33. Alkarama similarly noted that the authorities had increased their efforts to repress questioning and criticism of the authorities and their policies, most particularly in the past few months. Activists and reformers had been subjected to legal proceedings, arbitrary detention, unfair trials, travel bans and even the withdrawal of their nationalities.⁴⁸

34. JS1 stated that the UAE had failed to implement accepted recommendations to "reform the 1980 law on publications and all other related laws so as to take into account the evolution of freedom of expression and opinion" and to "take concrete measures to limit the number and extent of restrictions on the right to freedom of expression and the freedom of the press."⁴⁹

35. Reporters Without Borders (RWB) observed that the Federal National Council, in January 2009, had approved a draft media law in that contained a number of improvements, which, however, had not been signed into law.⁵⁰

36. FLD, Alkarama and RWB drew attention to indications given by the Ministry of Interior that changes would be made to the Cyber Crimes Law (Law No. 2 of 2006). These changes would include longer prison terms for defamation against 'symbols of the State', and the introduction of other types of sanctions, such as banning individuals from the use of mobile phones and the internet for a period of time.⁵¹

37. RWB noted that online forums for dissident political opinions, non-orthodox views of Islam or criticism of society, particularly the royal family, religion or human rights violations, had been rendered inaccessible through online censorship, and that the police was keeping a close watch on social networks such as Twitter and Facebook.⁵² FLD indicated that the authorities had limited access to the Internet by blocking discussion forums such as Al Hewar. According to FLD, e-mail and twitter accounts used by bloggers and online activists had been hacked and blocked.⁵³

38. FLD was concerned by the persecution of human rights defenders, who were subjected to threats, travel bans, arbitrary dismissal from work, and judicial harassment. According to FLD, human rights defenders face grave risks, and those criticising government policies or exposing human rights violations are targeted and considered as a security threat.⁵⁴ AI indicated that Islamists or those critical of the human rights or political situation often faced arbitrary detention and unfair trials.⁵⁵ FLD and RWB indicated that several political reformists had been deprived of their nationality, most recently in early 2012. Also in 2012, authorities had ordered the deportation of a blogger and online media activist.⁵⁶ Human rights defenders reported being put under surveillance and having their phones monitored by the security agencies.⁵⁷

39. FLD noted that although Federal Law No. 2 of 2008 on National Societies and Associations of Public Welfare in principle allowed for the establishment of associations, its provisions were restrictive and granted the government broad discretionary powers to refuse registration, impose the dissolution of their boards on vaguely defined grounds, and interfere with the management of associations. National human rights organizations were

denied official recognition or subject to strict government control.⁵⁸ AI similarly noted that NGOs are severely limited by the Law on Associations, article 16 of which prohibits them and their members from interfering “in politics or in matters that impair state security and its ruling regime”. According to AI, this contradicts international law, including the Arab Charter, which provides for freedom of association, subject only to restrictions prescribed by law and which are for reasons of “national security or public safety, public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.⁵⁹

40. Alkarama noted that political parties remained banned, and that the authorities were weary of the creation of new associations and organisations. In addition to the restrictive Law on Associations, they used various measures to prevent civil society organisations from carrying out their activities. Some associations had their boards dismissed and replaced by State-appointed individuals, supposedly for having violated section 16 of the Law on Associations.⁶⁰ Alkarama, AI and ICSRF indicated that this had happened in April 2011 to the Lawyers’ Association, which is the main jurists’ association in the UAE.⁶¹ According to AI and FLD, the Jurist Association had faced growing restrictions on its activities since the 2008 UPR. In 2010, the government had prohibited representatives from taking part in meetings outside the UAE and cancelled seminars planned by the organization without giving a substantive reason.⁶² According to FLD, a member of the Jurists Association had been arbitrarily arrested in June 2009 and, upon his release, banned from travelling abroad.⁶³

41. Alkarama noted that in May 2011, the Board of the Teachers’ Association had been replaced.⁶⁴ According to FLD, an active board member of the Teachers Association had been arrested in February 2011, after expressing his support for the Egyptian demonstrators in a speech at a public gathering. After being charged with “disturbing public security” he had been released on bail.⁶⁵ Furthermore, according to Alkarama, the board of *Al-Islah Reform and Social Guidance Association* had also been dismissed, and members of *Al-Islah* and other organisations had been subjected to prosecutions and repression by the security forces. Many had been removed from their educational, army and security government positions through forced retirement or sacking.⁶⁶ Alkarama and JS1 indicated that seven members of *Al-Islah* had had their UAE nationality withdrawn in 2011 and been detained since March 2012, after refusing to sign a pledge to search for a new nationality.⁶⁷ JS1 noted that in March 2012, the authorities had detained 13 members of *Al-Islah*, who had since been held without charge at unknown locations, without access to a lawyer or contact with family members.⁶⁸

42. JS1 and RWB noted that in April 2011, the authorities had arrested the well-known blogger Ahmed Mansour, administrator of the internet forum *Al-Hewar* (“Dialogue”), and four other online activists, who together came to be known as the “UAE 5”.⁶⁹ AI and Alkarama noted that the “UAE 5” had been charged under Articles 176 and 8 of the Penal Code with ‘publicly insulting’ UAE rulers. However, according to JS1, none of the online messages attributed to the UAE 5 had gone beyond peaceful criticism of government policy or political leaders.⁷⁰ AI indicated that, after being sentenced to prison terms of two to three years, the President had ordered the release of the five activists.⁷¹ FLD, while welcoming their release, remained concerned that the convictions had not been expunged and that the five men remained with a criminal record.⁷² Furthermore, FLD and JS1 indicated that one of the five, who had been active in demanding political reform, had subsequently been re-arrested and issued with an order of deportation.⁷³

43. AI, Alkarama and FLD noted that, in March 2012, the authorities had closed the local offices of two international organizations, the National Democratic Institute and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, both of which promoted the exchange of ideas and political debate as the foundation of democracy.⁷⁴

44. Regarding the right to freedom of expression and opinion, JS1, AI and Alkarama called on the UAE to remove all criminal penalties for alleged libel offenses from the Penal Code, in particular Articles 176 and 8 of the Penal Code.⁷⁵ JS1 and RWB also

recommended that the UAE repeal the 1980 Law on Publications and amend other legislation so as to bring it into line with international standards on respect for freedom of the media and information.⁷⁶ RWB further recommended that the UAE involve civil society and international NGOs in discussions on amending the Cyber Crime Law so as to bring it in line with international standards on free speech.⁷⁷ ICSRF recommended the adoption of a law to regulate the work of journalists in a manner that would ensure that they are protected in the performance of their work.⁷⁸

45. Furthermore, JS1 called on the UAE to uphold the right to freedom of assembly by allowing peaceful public gatherings and demonstrations.⁷⁹ RWB recommended that the UAE stop arresting and harassing dissidents and activists.⁸⁰ Alkarama recommended that the UAE halt all persecution of human rights defenders and those peacefully expressing their opinions, including online; and immediately release and expunge the convictions of those convicted for expressing their opinion peacefully.⁸¹ AI called on the UAE to ensure that all detainees are charged with an internationally recognizable criminal offence and receive a fair trial; to amend the procedures of State Security trials to ensure that they meet international fair trial standards; and to end attempts to deprive political activists who exercise the right to peaceful expression of their UAE citizenship.⁸²

46. Regarding the right to freedom of association, AI called on the UAE to bring laws governing NGOs in line with international human rights law and standards.⁸³ In particular, AI, JS1, FLD and Alkarama called on the UAE to amend the 2008 Law on Associations, including its Article 16, to ensure that NGOs can function free from state interference.⁸⁴ Alkarama also recommended that the UAE reinstate the boards of associations which have been removed under this law.⁸⁵ ICSRF recommended the amendment of legislation to allow full freedom for the establishment of associations, and the adoption of a law organizing the work of civil society organizations in a way which ensures the protection of human rights defenders in the performance of their work.⁸⁶

47. FLD called on the United Nations to urge the UAE authorities to conduct an impartial and thorough inquiry into the source of intimidation and harassment of human rights defenders; lift all restrictions imposed on human rights defenders and the legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression; ensure that human rights defenders arbitrarily dismissed from their work place are fully reinstated in their positions; allow Internet forums such as *UAE Hewar* to operate and refrain from blocking any other website legitimately used to freely debate about the human rights and political situation in the country.⁸⁷

F. Right to work and to just and favourable conditions of work

48. AI was concerned that domestic workers continue to be excluded from the protection of national labour legislation, with the result that they do not formally have the right to limits on working hours, rest breaks and paid holidays in line with ILO standards. However, AI noted a local press report in May 2012 according to which the authorities were proposing a draft law on domestic workers, which would reportedly include provisions to guarantee monthly payment of wages, one paid day off a week, and 14 days paid annual leave. AI called on the UAE to ensure that the provisions of the ILO Convention on Decent Work for Domestic Workers are fully integrated into national legislation and implemented in practice.⁸⁸

49. JS1 recommended that the UAE allow the establishment of independent workers' rights organizations that can bring abuses to light and help workers defend their rights; to prohibit companies from doing business with recruitment agencies that violate UAE laws by charging workers recruitment fees; and to prosecute and impose significant penalties on employers and recruiting agencies that abuse employees in violation of the law.⁸⁹

G. Migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers

50. JS1 noted that sponsorship laws granted employers extraordinary power over the lives of migrant workers, who had no right to organize, bargain collectively or go on strike. However, it acknowledged that the past two years had shown some positive developments for migrant workers, thus partly implementing a UPR recommendation to “protect them from possible abuses by their employers”. In January 2011, the Government had issued new labor regulations to curb exploitative recruiting agents who entrap foreign workers with recruiting fees and false contracts. In June 2009, the UAE had approved compulsory housing standards to improve living conditions for migrant workers, to be complied with by September 2014. Despite these steps, many problems remained, including unsafe work environments, the withholding of travel documents, near universal payment of recruitment fees by workers, and non-payment of wages, despite a mandatory electronic payment system introduced in 2009. Although the law calls for a minimum wage, the Ministry of Labor had yet to implement this provision.

51. JS1 noted reports that the UAE was considering a draft law that would provide domestic workers a weekly paid day off, two weeks of paid annual leave, holidays, and 15 paid sick days. However, it expressed concern at reports that draft provisions envisaged criminal sanctions for domestic workers who reveal the “secrets” of their employer, and for those who encourage a domestic worker to quit her job or offer her shelter.⁹⁰

52. AI stated that, although the UAE had accepted recommendations on foreign migrant labour, such workers continued to be inadequately protected against exploitation and abuse by their employers or sponsors. Problems included long working hours for little pay, poor living conditions, the confiscation of passports, and non-payment of wages.⁹¹

53. Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) observed that migrant workers contracted to construction companies in the UAE often had to incur debt to pay heavy fees to labour supply agencies in their home countries, although such fees were prohibited by UAE law. According to IHRC, labour laws protecting employees’ rights, including punctual payment of wages, were only loosely enforced. IHRC noted that female domestic workers in particular faced problems such as unpaid wages, long working hours, food deprivation, forced confinement and abuse. While noting that the year 2011 had seen some positive developments for migrant workers, IHRC stated that more needed to be done.⁹² ODVV similarly believed that further efforts were necessary to strengthen capacities for the protection of the living and working conditions of migrant workers.⁹³

H. Counter-terrorism

54. Alkarama drew attention to the trial of two non-citizens who had been arrested in June 2008 and tried after two years in solitary confinement. Alkarama noted reports by fellow detainees that the two men had been tortured during their detention. Following a summary trial, reportedly based mainly on forced confessions, they had been found guilty in June 2010 and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. Alkarama feared that they may have been deported to their country of origin, where they may face the death penalty.⁹⁴

Notes

¹ The stakeholders listed below have contributed information for this summary. The full texts of all original submissions are available at: www.ohchr.org.

Civil society:

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| AI | Amnesty International; |
| ALKARAMA | Alkarama (Geneva, Switzerland); |

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| | FLD | Front Line Defenders -The International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (Dublin, Ireland); |
| | GIEACPC | Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children; |
| | ICSRF | The International Center for Supporting Rights and Freedoms (Cairo); |
| | IHRC | Islamic Human Rights Commission (London, United Kingdom); |
| | JS1 | Joint Submission 1: Human Rights Watch; Network for Human Rights Information; Gulf Centre for Human Rights; Index on Censorship; |
| | ODVV | Organization for Defending Victims of Violence (Tehran); |
| | RWB | Reporters without Borders (France). |
| 2 | AI, p. 4, ICSRF, p. 2. | |
| 3 | Alkarama, p. 6. | |
| 4 | AI, p. 4. | |
| 5 | ICSRF, p. 4; ODVV, pp. 3-4. | |
| 6 | ODVV, pp. 3-4. | |
| 7 | JS1, p. 7. | |
| 8 | ICSRF, p. 2. | |
| 9 | AI, p. 4. | |
| 10 | ICSRF, p. 5. | |
| 11 | Alkarama, p. 6. | |
| 12 | JS1, p. 10. | |
| 13 | Alkarama, p. 6. | |
| 14 | AI, p. 1. | |
| 15 | Alkarama, p. 6. | |
| 16 | AI, p. 2. | |
| 17 | JS1, pp. 8-9. | |
| 18 | JS1, p. 7. | |
| 19 | Alkarama, pp. 5-6. | |
| 20 | ICSRF, pp. 4-5. | |
| 21 | JS1, p. 7. | |
| 22 | JS1, pp. 7-8. | |
| 23 | AI, p. 2. | |
| 24 | AI, p. 4. | |
| 25 | ICSRF, p. 2. | |
| 26 | Alkarama, p. 4. | |
| 27 | ICSRF, p. 3. | |
| 28 | JS1, p. 10. | |
| 29 | Alkarama, p. 6. | |
| 30 | ICSRF, p. 4. | |
| 31 | AI, pp. 3-4. | |
| 32 | ODVV, p. 3. | |
| 33 | JS1, pp. 8-9. | |
| 34 | JS1, pp. 8-9. | |
| 35 | AI, p. 1. | |
| 36 | JS1, pp. 8-9. | |
| 37 | JS1, pp. 8-9. | |
| 38 | GIEACPC, pp. 2-3. | |
| 39 | JS1, pp. 4-5. | |
| 40 | Alkarama, p. 6. | |
| 41 | AI, p. 5. | |
| 42 | Alkarama, p. 6. | |
| 43 | ICSRF, p. 4. | |
| 44 | ODVV, p. 4. | |
| 45 | AI, p. 1. | |

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- 46 AI, p. 1.
47 AI, p.2; FLD, pp. 1-2.
48 Alkarama, p. 2.
49 JS1, p. 1.
50 RWB, p. 3.
51 Alkarama, pp. 3-4, RWB, p. 3.
52 RWB, p. 1.
53 FLD, pp. 1-2.
54 FLD, p. 1.
55 AI, p. 2.
56 FLD, p. 2; RWB, pp. 2-3.
57 FLD, p. 3.
58 LD, pp. 1-2.
59 AI, p. 5.
60 Alkarama, p. 2.
61 Alkarama, p. 2.
62 AI, p. 5.
63 FLD, p. 3.
64 Alkarama, p. 2.
65 FLD, P. 3.
66 Alkarama, p. 2.
67 Alkarama, p. 3. See also AI, p. 3.
68 S1, p. 3.
69 JS1, p. 2.
70 JS1, p. 2.
71 AI, pp. 2-3.
72 FLD, p. 3.
73 FLD, p. 3, JS1, p. 8.
74 AI, pp. 2-3, FLD, p. 1.
75 AI, p. 5; JS1, p. 4; Alkarama, p. 6.
76 JS1, p. 4; RWB, p. 3.
77 RWB, p. 3.
78 ICSRF, p. 3.
79 JS1, p. 4.
80 RWB, p. 3.
81 Alkarama, p. 6.
82 AI, p. 5.
83 AI, p. 5.
84 AI, p. 5; JS1, p. 4; Alkarama, p. 6.
85 Alkarama, p. 6.
86 ICSRF, p. 5.
87 FLD, pp. 3-4.
88 AI, pp. 2, 4.
89 JS1, pp. 5-7.
90 JS1, pp. 5-7.
91 AI, p. 1.
92 IHRC, pp. 3-4.
93 ODVV, p. 2.
94 lkarama, p. 4.
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